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Motor Vehicle Unprotected
Intersection Collisions: Motorists
On the Right May No Longer
Have the Right-of-Way
I. INTRODUCTION
Two startling highway safety instructions appeared in recent
manuals issued by the National Safety Council on the subject of
defensive driving. The latest edition of the Student Workbook and
Defensive Driver's Manual stated that when a motorist approaches
an open intersection he should "[1]ook first to the LEFT, then to
the right, because traffic coming from the left is closer ... and
would cross [his] path first."'
The same advice, though stronger, appeared in the 1975 Instruc-
tor's Manual issued by the National Safety Council for a defensive
driving course. This manual suggested that the instructor ask his
class the following question: "DO YOU AGREE THAT ON AP-
PROACHING AN INTERSECTION YOU SHOULD LOOK FIRST
TO THE LEFT AND THEN TO THE RIGHT? ' 2 To this the in-
structor is given the suggested answer, "Yes, since danger from the
left is nearest you."3 The manual also has the instructor ask,
"WHO HAS THE RIGHT-OF-WAY WHEN TWO CARS AP-
PROACH AN INTERSECTION AT THE SAME TIME?"'4 The in-
structor is given the suggested answer, "No one has the right-of-
way."5 The manual explains:
That's right. Listen to what the Uniform Vehicle Code says.
"When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways
* LLB 1950, University of Nebraska. Practicing attorney, Fremont, Ne-
braska. Author of NEBRASKA AUTOmOBILE NEGLiGENCE LAw (1957).
1. NATiONAL SAFETY CouNciL, STUDENT WORKBOOK AND DEFENSIVE Dsiv-
ER'S MANUAL 15 (7th ed. 1975).
2. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, INsTUCTOR's MANUAL, DEENsrV DRrviNG
CoURsE 15 (4th ed. 1975).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
RIGHT-OF-WAY
at the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield
the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right."
The law never gives the right-of-way to anyone. It states who
shall yield and places a penalty on the driver who fails to do so.
If you survive the crash, you may have the other driver arrest-
ed, but don't make the mistake of thinking the law has given you
the right-of-way.6
One startling feature of this advice in the safety manuals is the
fact that recent statutory intersection right-of-way rules7 would
seem at least at first glance to give the motorist on the right the
right-of-way where two motorists approach an unprotected inter-
section, requiring each motorist to look first and primarily to the
right.
Certainly the law on intersection right-of-way should be in ac-
cordance with highway safety. If safety requires a motorist ap-
proaching an unprotected intersection to look first to the left, cer-
tainly the law should not require him to look first and foremost
to the right. In addition, it may be the natural reaction of most
motorists to look first to the left,8 and it is confusing if there is
no right-of-way. Nebraska's law follows the Uniform Vehicle
Code.9
This article raises the question of whether any rule which gives
the motorist on the right any preference whatever is contrary to
highway safety, obsolete, and should be removed.
II. EARLY TRAFFIC REGULATION
Most early motor vehicle traffic laws were enacted by cities,
towns and villages.10 The result was a patchwork of incongruous
legislation, each municipality having its own code of regulations,
and the motorist not knowing from one town to another whether
he was breaking the law or not."
6. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
7. Nebraska's most recent enactment concerning right-of-way at unpro-
tected intersections is found in NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-635 (Reissue 1974).
The act provides that when "two vehicles approach or enter an inter-
section from different roadways at approximately the same time, the
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the ve-
hicle on the right." Id.
8. A motorist may tend to look first to the left merely from the habit of
reading from left to right, or because of the fact that a car coming from
the left may present more of a danger to the driver than one coming
from the right, his own car acting as a cushion against vehicles ap-
proaching from the right.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See E. FnsEr, VEmcLE TRAFFIc LAw 21 (rev. 1974).
11. Id. at 22.
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A. Common Law
At common law, or in the absence of controlling statute, courts
across the nation generally held that the vehicle first entering the
intersection had the right-of-way.1 2 However, as far back as 1921,
the Kansas Supreme Court indicated that the old rule of giving
right-of-way to the first vehicle reaching the intersection was not
suitable to automobile traffic because of the greater speed of motor
vehicles, requiring the motorists to be able to determine the right-
of-way before either actually entered the intersection. 3 A 1922
Kansas case stated that a "rule giving priority to whichever vehicle
first reaches the intersection is obviously not well adapted to au-
tomobile traffic."'1 4 As time progressed, it was decided that the rule
which gave right-of-way to the first-entering vehicle "tended to
multiply collisions and confuse the traffic."' 5
In an attempt to find a better solution as to who should have
the right-of-way, a 1920 Kentucky case described an ordinance of
Louisville, Kentucky, providing that all vehicles going in an east-
erly or westerly direction should have the right-of-way over vehi-
cles going in a northerly or southerly direction!' An early St.
Louis ordinance gave the right-of-way to vehicles on north-south
streets. However, this compass direction theory never caught hold,
perhaps for the obvious reason that a motorist might not know or
be thinking about the compass direction he was traveling, and also
because of intersections where the roads went neither east-west,
nor north-south.
The rule, accordingly, developed that where two cars approached
or entered an intersection at about the same time, the car on the
right had the right-of-way and the car on the left had a duty to
yield. This appeared to be a simpler and safer rule.17
So, there developed a double rule, that the car reaching the in-
tersection substantially in advance of the one on the right had the
right-of-way, but otherwise the right-of-way belonged to the car on
the right.'8
12. 3 BLASHFIELD AUTOMOBILE LAw AND PRACTICE § 114.62 (3d ed. F. Lewis
& P. Kelly 1965); E. FIsHER, RiGriT oF WAY 3n TRAFc LAw ENFORCE-
MNT 31 (1956).
13. Fox v. McCormick, 110 Kan. 91, 202 P. 614 (1921).
14. Hughes v. Hudson-Brace Motor Co., 111 Kan. 397, 401, 207 P. 795, 797
(1922).
15. Echols v. Vinson, 220 Ala. 229, 230-31, 124 So. 510, 511 (1929).
16. Miller v. Weck, 186 Ky. 552, 217 S.W. 904 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920).
17. See Echols v. Vinson, 220 Ala. 229, 124 So. 511. See also 3 BLASHFD
AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 12.
18. E. FISHER, supra note 10, at 34-35.
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The problem in applying the old test of giving right-of-way to
the first-entering vehicle was that after a collision, it was difficult
to determine who really had the right-of-way.19 However, the dou-
ble rule also had its obvious weakness in that the application of
the rule required consideration of particular circumstances, such as
speed and the distance of the vehicles from the intersection. There-
fore, this rule also worked out unsatisfactorily in its practical ap-
plication, and rendered the "traveler's insecurity almost, if not
quite, as great as if no regulations existed."20
B. Statutory Law
Nebraska's first statute on intersection right-of-way was enacted
in 1927,21 one year after the first national Uniform Vehicle Code
was written. The first Nebraska statutes creating general traffic
laws were enacted in 193122 and provided that when "two vehicles
approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time,
the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way
to the vehicle on the right .... The driver of any vehicle travel-
ing at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right-of-way which he
might otherwise have hereunder."' 23 Earlier Nebraska statutes only
regulated the speed of vehicles24 and the obligation of carriages
meeting each other to turn to the right of the center of the road.25
If it is surprising that Nebraska statutes on the subject of inter-
section right-of-way were first enacted so recently, it should be re-
membered that there have been large numbers of motor vehicles
in this state, and even public roads and intersections, for only a
few decades. The first cross-country highway, Highway 30, was
not even begun until 1914,26 nor hard-surfaced through Columbus
until about 1930.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Epperson v. Utley,27 indicated
that the first Nebraska statute on intersection right-of-way was en-
19. Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952).
20. Annot., 89 A.L.R. 838, 839 (1934).
21. Act of Apr. 23, 1927, ch. 154, § 1, [1927] Neb. Laws 412 (repealed
1971).
22. Act of May 7, 1931, ch. 110, § 17 (a), [1931] Neb. Laws 311 (repealed
1973). See also, Minutes of the Eighty-third Nebraska Legislature,
First Session, LB 45, at 3001 (Apr. 30, 1973).
23. Act of May 7, 1931, ch. 110, § 17 (a) [1931] Neb. Laws 311 (repealed
1973).
24. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 11, 1919, ch. 222, § 28, [19193 Neb. Laws 963
(repealed 1933).
25. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1879, § 60, [1879] Neb. Laws 133 (repealed
1974).
26. 12 WORLD BOOK ENCYcLOPEDrA 287 (1964).
27. 191 Neb. 413, 215 N.W.2d 864 (1974).
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acted in 1927. The opinion stated that the "Nebraska common law
regulating the right-of-way, in the absence of regulations to the
contrary, provided the first to enter upon a crossing had the right-
of-way with respect to vehicles approaching a street crossing at in-
tersecting points. ' ' 28 This is basically incorrect, though some of the
earliest intersection accident cases indicated that neither vehicle at
an unprotected intersection had the right of way. This appears per-
haps to have been the rule even before the common law rule giving
right-of-way to the first to enter.
C. Earliest Rule in Nebraska
Apparently, the earliest Nebraska intersection accident case in-
volved an 1890 accident. The court considered the collision between
a buggy and a street car at an open intersection and stated:
At such an intersection each have [sic] the right to cross and must
cross. Neither has a superior right to the other. The right of each
must be exercised with due regard to the right of the other, and the
right of each must be exercised in a reasonable and careful manner
so as not to unreasonably abridge or interfere with the right of
the other.29
This statement was held by the court in later decisions to be
a proper instruction.30 A 1912 decision involving an open intersec-
tion collision held that the rights of a driver of a horse attached
to a carriage were not superior to the rights of a driver of an auto-
mobile. The court noted that it was told there were 750,000 auto-
mobiles in use in the United States alone. 31
However, in a case involving a 1916 accident, the court held that
in an open intersection collision, "the defendant's driver having first
entered upon the intersection of the two streets, in the absence of
some regulation to the contrary, had the right of way. ' '32 The court
went on to say that the law of the road did not require that a wagon
stop and allow an automobile to pass in front simply because the
latter was a faster-moving vehicle. Nevertheless, the Nebraska
cases regarding open intersection accidents before the 1927 statute
28. Id. at 418, 215 N.W.2d at 867.
29. Omaha St. Ry. v. Cameron, 43 Neb. 297, 305, 61 N.W. 606, 609 (1895)
(emphasis added).
30. See Pierce v. Lincoln Traction Co., 92 Neb. 797, 799, 139 N.W. 656, 657
(1913); Stewart v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 88 Neb. 209, 210-11, 129 N.W.
440, 441 (1911) (pedestrian and street car); Olney v. Omaha & C.B.
St. Ry., 78 Neb. 767, 770-71, 111 N.W. 784, 785 (1907) (buggy and street
car).
31. Tyler v. Hoover, 92 Neb. 221, 235, 138 N.W. 128, 133 (1921).
32. Barrett v. Alamito Dairy Co., 105 Neb. 658, 661, 181 N.W. 550, 551
(1921).
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do not generally determine right-of-way, but rather simply due
care, with charges of negligence such as excessive speed, lack of
warning, and lack of lookout.33
In a 1926 decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused "to ap-
ply to automobiles approaching an intersection at right angles the
same rule as applies to railway crossings, to-wit that it is the duty
of a driver upon the highway approaching a railroad crossing to
look and listen for trains"34 and that failure to do so prevents re-
covery of damages. On the other hand, in cases before 1927 where
the accident occurred in a town intersection where there was an
ordinance in effect giving right-of-way, the court of course in-
structed on the ordinance involved. 35
One of the early cases after the right-of-way statutes had gone
into effect indicated that a reason for the new statute came from
a "recognition by the legislature of the dangers growing out of a
situation permitting one to race for a right of way at an intersec-
tion."36 Another case, decided after 1931, held that although the
plaintiff was on a main-traveled road and collided with defendant
coming from the right on a less-traveled road, the plaintiff did not
have the right-of-way.3 7
The foregoing shows the long frustration in seeking the ideal
right-of-way rule.
Enactment of the first state statute setting forth who had right-
of-way at an intersection did not end the confusion in intersection
accident cases. Without looking at the cases in detail, it is true that
despite the facts of a collision of two vehicles at an intersection,
a lawyer can almost certainly find at least one case close to his facts
supporting his client and another against his client.
In one of the first cases after the 1931 general traffic statutes
went into effect, where the plaintiff's car was struck on its left side
near the front, the court affirmed a directed verdict for the defend-
ant on the ground that plaintiff's failure to look barred his recovery
even though he had the directional right-of-way.38
III. RECENT LEGISLATION
The 1969, 1971 and 1973 Nebraska Legislatures made radical
changes in the intersection right-of-way rules so as to drastically
33. See, e.g., Andersen v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 116 Neb. 487, 218 N.W.
135 (1928).
34. Thrapp v. Meyers, 114 Neb. 689, 692, 209 N.W. 238, 239 (1926).
35. Dirks v. Ensign Omnibus & Transfer Co., 107 Neb. 556, 186 N.W. 525
(1922).
36. Doan v. Hoppe, 133 Neb. 767, 770, 277 N.W. 64, 65 (1938).
37. Whittaker v. Hanifin, 138 Neb. 18, 291 N.W. 723 (1940).
38. Nelson v. Plautz, 130 Neb. 641, 644, 265 N.W. 885, 886 (1936).
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down-grade the rights both of the motorist on the right and on the
left. In particular, under the 1969 legislative changes, Nebraska
statutes no longer provided that motorists on the right would "have
the right-of-way."
A. Substance of Changes
In 1961, there were two Nebraska intersection right-of-way stat-
utes in effect.39 Section 39-728 provided that motor vehicles on the
left should give right-of-way to vehicles on the right and those
on the right should have the right-of-way over vehicles approach-
ing from the left when the vehicles reached the intersection at the
same time.40 It further provided that in all other cases, the vehicle
reaching the intersection first should "have the right-of-way."'4 1
Section 39-751 was partly a duplication of the section 39-728 pro-
visions, stating that when two vehicles approached or entered an
intersection at approximately the same time, the driver on the left
should yield right-of-way to that on the right. It further provided
that any driver traveling at an unlawful speed should forfeit any
right-of-way he might otherwise have.42
The 1969 legislature amended both of these sections by making
changes, which at first glance might appear to be of little import-
ance, but which do have great impact.43 The two sections were
changed to provide (1) that a vehicle should yield right-of-way
to another vehicle which had entered the intersection and (2) that
when two vehicles entered an intersection at approximately the
same time, the driver on the left should yield to that on the right.
One change was to remove the provision that unlawful speed for-
feits right-of-way. However, the drastic and easily overlooked
change was that though a motorist continued to be obliged to yield
to a motorist already within the intersection regardless of the direc-
tion from which he came, and the motorist on the left was required
to yield to the motorist on the right when they entered at about
the same time-the provisions were removed that the yielded-to-
39. Act of May 7, 1931, ch. 110, § 17, [1931] Neb. Laws 311 (repealed
1973); Act of Apr. 23, 1927, ch. 154, § 1, [1927] Neb. Laws 412 (re-
pealed 1971).
40. Act of May 10, 1961, ch. 184, § 27, [1961] Neb. Laws 559 (repealed
1971).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 29, [1961] Neb. Laws 560 (repealed 1973).
43. Act of Apr. 25, 1969, ch. 324, § 1, [1969] Neb. Laws 1166 (repealed
1973); Act of Apr. 16, 1969, ch. 320, § 1, [1969] Neb. Laws 1160 (re-
pealed 1971).
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motorist should "have the right-of-way" over the other vehicle in
both situations.
This change in terminology was no mere exercise in semantics.
Rather it was a substantial change in intersection right-of-way
rules, as will be discussed in connection with the legislative history
of the change.
In practical effect, the changes by the 1969 legislature appear
ordinarily to have the effect of preventing the motorist on the left
who entered the intersection first and was struck on his extreme
right rear from collecting damages; as he shall no longer "have the
right-of-way." Also, the motorist struck on his left side would or-
dinarily be barred from obtaining his damages-since he also no
longer would "have the right-of-way." The 1971 legislative changes
appear to be simply of form and not of substance.44
Then, in 1973, the legislature passed the new codification of the
rules of the road, effective January 1, 1974, and in the process re-
pealed section 39-751. The new replacement section is 39-63545
which does make a substantive change from the previous provision.
Section 39-635 entirely removed the provision that a driver of a ve-
hicle approaching an intersection should yield the right-of-way to
a vehicle which entered the intersection from a different highway.
Section 39-635 thus down-graded further the claim of a motorist on
the left who entered the intersection first. All that remained of
the old right-of-way rules in the new section 39-635 is the provision
that when "two vehicles approach or enter an intersection from dif-
ferent roadways at approximately the same time, the driver of the
vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on
the right.'' 4
Section 39-635, as it presently stands, seems to say that when
there is an intersection collision, the motorist on the left is clearly
in the wrong, because he did not yield right-of-way, so he cannot
recover his damages. However, the section does not say that the
motorist on the right shall have the right-of-way, so ordinarily he
also is barred. This reasoning is supported by the comments in the
defensive driving course Instructor's Manual that the "law never
gives the right-of-way to anyone.1
47
The same legislature which removed the forfeiture-by-speed
clause removed the "shall have the right-of-way" clauses. If, as Ep-
44. Act of Mar. 29, 1971, LB 265, § 1, [1971] Neb. Laws (repealed 1973).
45. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-635 (Reissue 1974).
46. Id.
47. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 9.
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person suggests, 48 removal of the first clause eliminated it as law,
certainly removal of the second clauses likewise eliminated them.
A "rule of reason" cannot restore the "shall have the right-of-way"
clauses.
The removal in both places of the language "shall have the right-
of-way" was not a change in verbiage without change in meaning,
but rather was intended to do exactly what it says, to remove the
right-of-way previously given the motorist on the right or the first-
entering motorist.
The Nebraska Supreme Court so held in Epperson, where it dis-
cussed the fact that before the 1969 amendments, section 39-751 con-
tained a clause providing that the driver of any vehicle traveling
at an unlawful rate of speed would forfeit any right-of-way which
he might otherwise have had.4 9 The court also noted that the legis-
lative history of the hearing on the 1969 bill to amend section 39-
751 showed that on the floor of the legislature the forfeiture provi-
sion was eliminated so as to make section 39-751 conform to the Uni-
form Vehicle Code and to section 39-728. The court concluded that
since 1969, Nebraska statutes have contained no forfeiture of right-
of-way by unlawful speed provision.
In Epperson, the plaintiff argued that even though the forfeiture
provision had been eliminated by the 1969 legislature, it should nev-
ertheless be applied in Epperson where the collision occurred after
the 1969 amendments under "rule of reason." The court refused
to accept the argument, stating that the "forfeiture rule is com-
pletely derivative from statute and not from decisional law .... It
is beyond doubt that the Legislature in 1969 expressly excluded the
forfeiture provision from the applicable statutes. The intent was
clear."-" The court held that the trial court had properly refused
to instruct on forfeiture of right-of-way by unlawful speed.
The same reasoning by the court in Epperson as to the forfeiture
provision must apply as to removing the two "shall have the right-
of-way" clauses. These also were a creature of statute, not deci-
sional law, as the opinion in Epperson states.8 '
B. Legislative History
The history within the legislature as to the 1969 changes shows
that the legislature did indeed intend to remove the provision that
48. See Epperson v. Utley, 191 Neb. 413, 419-20, 215 N.W.2d 864, 868
(1974).
49. See id. at 419, 215 N.W.2d 864, 868 (1974).
50. Id. at 420, 215 N.W.2d at 869.
51. Id. at 419-20, 215 N.W.2d at 868.
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a motorist shall "have" the right-of-way. It shows an emphasis on
"defensive driving" and "yielding" right-of-way.
The 1969 bill, L.B. 448E, amended section 39-728. It was reported
out of the Committee on Public Works with a statement that the
purpose of the bill was to:
redefine the rules of the road pertaining to right-of-way at an
intersection to correspond with the latest revision of the Uniform
Vehicle Code. The present uniform code provisions have been
prepared with the emphasis on defensive driving, with the direction
to yield the right-of-way instead of conferring a right-of-way.52
Ralph Nelson, Lincoln city attorney, appeared for the bill. Nel-
son, in his testimony of March 7, 1969 stated that
the principal emphasis, the principal reasons for the change have
been the emphasis on defensive driving, as it becomes so impor-
tant in terms of traffic safety. The emphasis is on the yielding of
the right-of-way, instead of conferring the right-of-way.r.3
Nelson added that the "emphasis is all now on defensive driving,
trying to make sure that we ... guaranteeing our own individual
rights of the driver that we watch out for the other individual, and
we drive defensively. This is the purpose, I think, primarily, of this
change. '5 4
Senator Fern H. Orme, principal introducer of L.B. 448 stated
in her Introducer's Statement of Purpose that the "present uniform
code provisions have been prepared with the emphasis on defensive
driving, with the direction to yield the right, of way instead of con-
ferring a right of way.""
The right-of-way provision of section 39-751 was amended by
L.B. 994 of the 1969 legislature. Rick Budd, as chairman of the
Committee on Public Works signed a statement on the bill, with
respect to left turns at intersections. The statement noted that the
"latest revision is in accord with modern emphasis on defensive
driving and good driving habits to require a yield to a vehicle ap-
proaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersec-
tion or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard."
'0
Also regarding L.B. 994, Nelson testified that again "we find the
changing emphasis on defensive driving, in this latest provision.
This is the purpose, to redefine the rules of the road on vehicles
turning left in terms of right-of-way. This would be a recurrence
52. Hearings on LB 448 Before the Comm. on Pub. Works, Neb. Legis.,
80th Sess., Committee Statement (Mar. 10, 1969).
53. Id. at 12 (Mar. 7, 1969).
54. Id.
55. Id., Introducer's Statement of Purpose (Feb. 21, 1969).
56. See note 52 supra.
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of the modern emphasis of defensive driving . . . . 57 The Intro-
ducer's Statement of Purpose58 said the bill was in accord with the
modern emphasis on defensive driving.
In 1971, L.B. 265 was introduced to further amend section 39-
751. Again, Nelson testified, stating that there "are drivers who
will insist upon a right-of-way even though another car is already
there, unfortunately."59
The 1973 legislative changes were made by way of L.B. 45. The
Introducer's Statement of Intent ° for this bill stated that a codifi-
cation of the national standards for uniform traffic regulation was
desired at the state level. The legislative history of the 1973 bill
did not indicate that the bill was intended to make any substantive
changes as far as intersection laws were concerned.
It is most important to note, especially regarding the 1969 legis-
lative changes in intersection laws, that constant reference was
made to "defensive driving" by those promoting the changes. The
1969 legislative history shows "defensive driving" mentioned at
least nine times in the promotion of the two 1969 bills. This preoc-
cupation with defensive driving should be compared to the discus-
sion in the National Safety Council's manuals, quoted earlier.,1 It
is as if the Nebraska Legislature adopted by reference the views
of the National Safety Council.
C. No Right-of-Way
It appears that since 1969, neither motorist in an open intersec-
tion has any right-of-way privilege. The motorist on the right can
have no right-of-way when the legislature expressly removed the
provision that such motorist should "have the right-of-way." The
instructor's manual as to defensive driving issued by the National
Safety Council interprets the law as giving right-of-way to neither
motorist at an intersection. This may be the best way of assuring
highway safety, for if a motorist realizes upon approaching an open
intersection that he does not have any right-of-way regardless of
the direction from which the other vehicles might come, he hope-
fully will tend to be much more cautious than if he approaches an
57. Hearings on LB 994 Before the Comm. on Pub. Works, Neb. Legis.,
80th Sess., at 13 (Mar. 7, 1969).
58. See note 55 supra.
59. Hearings on LB 265 Before the Comm. on Pub. Works, 82d Neb.
Legis., 1st sess., at 3-4 (Jan. 29, 1971).
60. Hearings on LB 45 Before the Comm. on Pub. Works, 83d Neb. Legis.,
1st Sess., Introducer's Statement of Intent (Jan. 11, 1973).
61. See note 2 supra.
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intersection with an understanding that he may have a "right-of-
way" over someone else.
There were Nebraska decisions involving accidents before 1969
where motorists on the left received awards when struck on the
right toward the rear, or the speed of the motorist on the right was
much greater. However, it seems that such holdings are now com-
pletely obsolete. The 1969 legislative amendments down graded the
rights of the motorist on the left triply. First, by removing the
clause that the motorist on the left should "have the right-of-way"
when he was first in the intersection. Second, they removed the
clause that excessive speed forfeits right-of-way. The latter provi-
sion was interpreted by the Nebraska Supreme Court as forfeiting
only the rights of the motorist on the right.62 Third, the rights
of the motorist on the left were given a final death blow when the
1973 legislature removed the clause that the second motorist who
entered an intersection had to yield to a motorist who had previ-
ously entered the intersection.
It may be a shock to the courts and lawyers at first to be pre-
sented with a theory that no one has a right-of-way at an intersec-
tion, even if this is the best law from the view of highway safety.
We are too accustomed to someone having a right-of-way, confusing
as the law has been on the subject.
However, as noted earlier,63 it appears under the first Nebraska
intersection accident cases that no one was accorded a right-of
way.64 So, if that should again be the law, it would be no great
shock to go back to what we had in the beginning. With the next
most recent rule, that the first-entering vehicle has the right-of-
way, removed from the statutes by the 1973 legislature, and with
previous confusion as to the dual test, one can hardly say that there
has been stability in the law of right-of-way. It would seem that
we are best off going back to no right-of-way at all by direction
or for first-entering vehicles. The recent course of decisions by the
Nebraska Supreme Court would suggest that there is not much left
of the directional right-of-way anyway, such that its complete re-
moval might be a gain rather than a loss.
At the very least, the 1969 legislature, by removing the "have
the right-of-way" clauses drastically down graded the rights of the
motorists on the right and on the left at intersections. As to ac-
cidents occurring since April, 1969, there is no justification for any
court instruction that the motorist on the right shall "have the
62. 191 Neb. at 419, 215 N.W.2d at 868.
63. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
64. Id.
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right-of-way" as that clause is strictly a creature of the legislature,
first created in 1927 and removed in 1969.
IV. RECENT CASE LAW
So many recent changes by the legislature in such rapid order
were confusing to say the least. The only way that a judge or law-
yer could see what effect the changes really had would be to copy
each of the bills enacted in 1961, 1969, 1971 and 1973 and carefully
compare them along with committee reports and testimony.
A. Statutory Changes Overlooked
As an indication that the courts and lawyers were apparently
unaware of the changes by the 1969 legislature, one might note
the 1972 decision of Dovey v. Sheridan,5 where an intersection
collision occured March 22, 1970, nearly a year after legislative
changes went into effect in April 1969."0 The case itself was
heard by the Nebraska Supreme Court about three and a half years
after the 1969 legislative changes went into effect. Yet, Dovey in-
dicated that the trial court instructed the jury on intersection right-
of-way that "vehicles traveling upon a public highway shall give
the right of way to vehicles approaching along intersecting high-
ways from the right, and shall have the right of way over those
approaching from the left, when said vehicles shall reach the inter-
section at approximately the same time. '6 7 The instructions given
the jury were in accord with section 39-728 as enacted in 1961, but
the language emphasized above was repealed by the 1969 legisla-
ture. However, as indicated, this was the instruction the trial court
gave and it is not criticized by the supreme court, even though the
emphasized language had been repealed three and a half years be-
fore the supreme court heard the case. One can only conclude that
neither the trial judge, the attorneys, nor the supreme court was
aware of the change which the legislature had made so long before.
Again, the court in the 1971 case of Hacker v. Perez"8 overlooked
the fact that the 1969 legislature had made the statutory changes.
In Hacker, an intersection collision occurred June 29, 1969, but the
court nevertheless held that the operator of a motor vehicle who
would otherwise have the right-of-way under statutory regulations
65. 189 Neb. 133, 201 N.W.2d 245 (1972).
66. See Act of Apr. 28, 1969, ch. 324, § 1, [1969] Neb. Laws 1660 (repealed
1973), amending NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-751 (Reissue 1968); Act of Apr.
16, 1969, ch. 320, § 1, [1969] Neb. Laws 1475 (repealed 1971), amending
NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-728 (Reissue 1968).
67. 189 Neb. at 136, 201 N.W.2d at 247.
68. 187 Neb. 485, 192 N.W.2d 166 (1971).
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loses it if he operates his vehicle at an unlawful rate of speed. This
is a provision which had been repealed more than two months be-
fore the accident.
Then, in the leading case of Hodgson v. Gladem,69 an intersection
collision occurred May 27, 1969, more than a month after the 1969
legislative changes had gone into effect, yet no mention of this fact
was made in the opinion. Hodgson made a statement, apparently
erroneous in view of the 1969 changes, that the "plaintiff had what
is usually referred to as the directional right-of-way.17 0 It also er-
roneously quoted the favored position of the motorist on the right
to be "forfeited because of excessive speed under the circum-
stances."' 71 This provision, as indicated earlier, was also repealed
by the 1969 legislature.
In KremZacek v. Sedlacek,7 2 an accident occurred after the 1969
legislative changes. The court determined that the "statute con-
templates that the driver on the left entering first has the right-
of-way when outside the range of 'at approximately the same
time.' Y73
In fact, none of the decisions by the court which have involved
intersection collisions occurring since the 1969 legislative changes
have mentioned these changes except Epperson,7 4 decided in 1974.
There, the court noted that under the 1969 legislative amendment,
unlawful speed by a motorist having directional right-of-way no
longer causes a forfeiture of right-of-way. The opinion disapproved
of Hacker to the extent that it implied that unlawful speed did for-
feit right-of-way. However, Epperson did not discuss the other
change by the 1969 legislature, removing the provisions that the
motorist on the right or first entering should "have the right-of-
way."
The Nebraska Jury Instructions published in 1969 also discussed
intersection right-of-way7 5 The instructions stated that where two
motorists approach an intersection at approximately the same time,
the driver approaching from the right "and traveling at a lawful
rate of speed has the right of way . . . . 76 The 1975 supplement
to the instructions noted that sections 39-728 and 39-751 were re-
69. 187 Neb. 736, 193 N.W.2d 779 (1972).
70. Id. at 739, 193 N.W.2d at 781.
71. Id. at 742, 193 N.W.2d at 783.
72. 190 Neb. 460, 209 N.W.2d 149 (1973).
73. Id. at 465, 209 N.W.2d at 154.
74. 191 Neb. 413, 215 N.W.2d 864 (1974).
75. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMNI. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, No. 7.10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
N.J.I.].
76. Id.
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pealed and section 39-635 replaced the repealed statutes. The latter
section was quoted. However, nothing was said about the state-
ment in the text being obsolete since April, 1969. 7 7 Apparently, dis-
trict courts have been instructing on the incorrect statement as it
appears in the bound volume since 1969, at least as to the "has the
right-of-way" clause.
The foregoing is not intended in the slightest to be a criticism
of lawyers or the courts in not keeping up with legislative changes.
Rather, it is a commentary on too many legislative changes, more
than busy lawyers and courts can sometimes manage.
B. Plaintiffs on Right Barred for Negligence
In Hodgson, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a case
where plaintiff's automobile entered a "blind" open country inter-
section at an admitted speed of 40-45 miles per hour and was struck
on the left door and left side by the defendant's car which was
traveling at about the same speed. The district court had entered
a directed verdict for defendant which was affirmed on appeal. The
supreme court held that though the plaintiff had the directional
right-of-way, he was nevertheless barred as a matter of law from
any recovery. The court said that the "underlying purpose of right-
of-way rules is, of course, to prevent collisions and they must be
applied ... in such a way that if the rules are observed they will
tend to have this result.178 The court concluded:
We hold that a driver approaching an unprotected intersection
where he knows and can readily observe that his view is obstructed
must do so at such a speed as will afford him a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make effective observations for cars approaching on the
intersecting road and give him a reasonable opportunity to proper-
ly react to the situation he then observes or could observe, and
where his view is completely obstructed and his speed is such that
he has given himself no opportunity at all to observe and react ap-
propriately he may, where the facts are undisputed, be found neg-
ligent as a matter of law. The trial court's determination was
correct.79
Very importantly, even though the court reached the result that
plaintiff was barred as a matter of law, it did so with the apparently
erroneous assumption that at the time of the accident, statutes still
stated that the motorist on the right should "have the right-of-
way." With the 1969 amendments denying the plaintiff in Hodg-
son right-of-way, there would be far more emphatic reason for
77. N.J.I. No. 7.10 has been obsolete since 1969, both as to the phrase "trav-
eling at a lawful rate of speed" and the phrase "has the right-of-way."
78. 187 Neb. at 740, 193 N.W.2d at 782.
79. Id. at 742, 193 N.W.2d at 783.
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holding the plaintiff barred. The court in Hodgson instead based
its decision on a discussion of earlier Nebraska cases holding barred
as a matfer of law a motorist on the right who entered an obscured
unprotected intersection.
Weber v. Southwest Nebraska Dairy Suppliers, Inc.,8 0 involved
a country unprotected road intersection collision between two
trucks. The accident occurred on July 23, 1969, once again after
the 1969 right-of-way amendments had gone into effect. In Weber,
the court indicated that, from the evidence, both parties could see
each other for at least 250 feet from the intersection.8 ' The truck
in which plaintiff's decedent was a passenger struck the left door
of defendant's truck. The court held under these facts the plain-
tiff's driver who was the motorist on the left was negligent as a
matter of law. The only question in the two appeals to the Ne-
braska Supreme Court therefore was whether the negligence of the
driver was imputed to plaintiff, and the jury ruled that it was. So,
Weber would appear to hold that in an intersection where two mo-
torists had a view of each other for at least 250 feet, the motorist
on the left is negligent as a matter of law. However, Weber also
stated that the "plaintiff's evidence would indicate that the defend-
ant was negligent in not maintaining a proper lookout. '8 2 Defend-
ant of course was the motorist on the right and was struck on the
left door.
Although Weber involved an accident which occurred after the
statutes had been changed to remove the language that the motorist
on the right should have the right-of-way, the Weber opinion
made no reference to this statutory change. Once again, the court
decided the rights and obligations on the basis of the pre-April 1969
law. If the 1969 legislative changes are applied, it appears that the
plaintiff and defendant were even more clearly negligent.
In Peterson v. DePrez, 3 a very recent case involving a country
road intersection collision, the court indicated that the evidence was
very vague as to obstructions to view, but still permitted the jury
to find that the views of both drivers were obstructed until within
a few feet of the intersection. Defendant's pickup truck had struck
the plaintiff's car near its left front door. Defendant testified to
a speed of 10-15 miles per hour, and plaintiff to 15 miles per hour,
just before the collision. There was a jury verdict for the defend-
ant, which was affirmed on appeal. The court cited Hodgson,
though the opinion used the important language that there "was
80. 187 Neb. 606, 193 N.W.2d 274 (1971).
81. Id. at 609, 193 N.W.2d at 276.
82. Id.
83. 196 Neb. 304, 242 N.W.2d 641 (1976).
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at least a jury question on the issue of plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence. ' '84 The opinion said that the only substantial difference be-
tween the evidence in Hodgson and in the instant case was that
in Peterson both vehicles were traveling much more slowly and
probably could have stopped had timely observation been made. As
the jury had found for defendant anyway, it was not necessary to
decide whether plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.
In Hodgson,8 5 the court barred from recovery as a matter of law
the plaintiff who entered a blind country road intersection at an
admitted 40-45 miles per hour and was struck on the left door and
side. However, Hodgson left open the question of whether the
court would apply the same rule if the intersection had been one
where the motorists had a long, clear view of each other.
The plaintiff in Hodgson had argued that his contributory negli-
gence, if any, was a question for the jury to decide. He relied on
Sanderson v. Westphalen, 6 where each motorist had a clear view
of the approach of the other for about 700 feet, the plaintiff had
the directional right-of-way but failed to see the approach of de-
fendant's vehicle, and the plaintiff could have expected to be seen
by a driver approaching from the left and therefore have his right-
of-way respected. The opinion in Hodgson said that Sanderson was
different from the Hodgson situation where neither motorist could
see the other until almost in the intersection. The Hodgson opinion
concluded that Sanderson was not applicable, and thus left unde-
cided the question of whether in a clear view intersection, as op-
posed to a blind intersection, the plaintiff who was on the right
was not negligent as a matter of law.
Arguably, a plaintiff on the right who collides in a clear view
intersection is barred even more emphatically as a matter of law
than such a plaintiff in the Hodgson situation where the intersec-
tion is blind.
First, Hodgson, though involving an accident which had occurred
after the 1969 amendment to the intersection right-of-way statute,
still applied the pre-April 1969 statutes.
Second, Sanderson involved an accident which occurred long
before 1969, during the time that the statutes gave the motorist on
the right the right-of-way where the two vehicles approached the
intersection at about the same time. In fact, as the Hodgson opin-
ion indicated, the basis of the Sanderson opinion, where the plain-
tiff was on the right, was that the plaintiff had a right to expect
84. Id. at 307, 242 N.W.2d at 643.
85. 187 Neb. 736, 193 N.W.2d 779 (1972).
86. 178 Neb. 298, 133 N.W.2d 16 (1965).
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the defendant to see him and the right to expect his right-of-way
to be respected. With the 1969 amendments to the statute removing
the "have the right-of-way" clauses, Sanderson is out of date, and
neither Sanderson nor the Hodgson discussion of it can have any
relevance.
Third, though the Hodgson opinion says that it is simply distin-
guishing itself from the facts in Sanderson, an analysis of the Hodg-
son opinion's authorities indicates that it in effect is disapproving
of Sanderson. There simply is no way that Hodgson and Sanderson
can be reconciled. Sanderson claims to overrule two cases, includ-
ing Evans v. Messick8 7 to the extent that it is in conflict with San-
derson. In Evans, the defendant ran into the left front door of
plaintiff's car in an open residential intersection where the view
was partly blocked. Plaintiff was held barred from recovery as a
matter of law. Yet, Evans, which Sanderson indicates that it over-
ruled, is the foremost case relied on by Barajas v. Parker,88 and
Barajas is the first and primary case relied on by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court in its Hodgson opinion. In fact, Barajas quoted from
Evans twice, and Evans is the only case from which Barajas
quoted.8 " This would seem to indicate that Evans, though over-
ruled by Sanderson in 1965, was un-overruled by Hodgson in 1972
and thus has been revived to strong life as to its holding that a
plaintiff struck on the left front door in what in Evans was a
partly-blind intersection is barred from recovering his damages as
a matter of law. In fact, Evans is itself cited in the Hodgson opin-
ion in the quotation where Barajas is quoted. In any event, where
Hodgson relies on what Sanderson disapproved, Hodgson is in effect
disapproving of Sanderson.
Fourth, under the practical reasoning of the Hodgson opinion,
if a plaintiff is barred who collides in a blind unprotected intersec-
tion where he had no reason to expect another motorist to be ap-
proaching at the same time, most certainly a plaintiff who has a
collision in an open clear view intersection where he can see the
other motorist approaching is barred. As to a blind intersection,
at least in the country as in Hodgson, there might be only one
chance in several thousand that another vehicle would be approach-
ing the intersection at the same time from the blind direction so
as to involve a collision. Yet, in a clear-view intersection the plain-
tiff approaching from the right has an opportunity to see that there
is a vehicle coming from his left and to know that the chances are
87. 158 Neb. 485, 63 N.W.2d 491 (1954).
88. 165 Neb. 444, 85 N.W.2d 894 (1957).
89. See id., 165 Neb. 444, 448, 449, 85 N.W.2d 894, 897 (1957), quoting from
Evans v. Messick, 158 Neb. 485, 63 N.W.2d 491, 492 (1954) (syllabus
by the court).
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100 per cent that there will be a collision, or a danger of such a
collision, if he does not slow or stop. A motorist who approaches
an intersection and sees or is able to see the car from the left and
who does not take the necessary steps to avoid collision, is far more
negligent than was the plaintiff in Hodgson. The plaintiff in Hodg-
son was on the right and entered a blind intersection too fast where
the chances were very remote that another vehicle would be enter-
ing the intersection at the same time.
The court in Hodgson said that the purpose of right-of-way rules
is not to give a motorist who has the right-of-way an excuse for
racing into an intersection and having an accident and then collect-
ing his damages. The underlying purpose of right-of-way rules is
to avoid collisions, and such reasoning must apply whether the in-
tersection is blind or has an open view for both motorists. Hodg-
son said that in an obstructed view intersection, both drivers must
approach the intersection at such speed that each may effectively
exercise an option on how to proceed when they reach a point
where they can see.90 Such reasoning would apply as much if not
more to an open view intersection as to a blind one.
Fifth, in an intersection collision where both motorists have long
clear views of each other, a collision will occur because both motor-
ists either (1) did not look in the direction of the other vehicle, (2)
looked in the direction of the other vehicle but did not see it, or
(3) looked and saw the approaching other vehicle but did nothing
to prevent collision. In any of these eventualities, both motorists
are necessarily negligent as a matter of law.
Hodgson, quoting with approval from an earlier case, Whitaker
v. Keogh,91 stated that:
The general rule governing the type of case at bar is that when
the injured party fails to look at all, or looks straight ahead with-
out looking to either side, or is in such a position that he cannot
see, or, in other words, when he takes no precaution at all for his
own safety, it is usually a question for the Court.92
This quotation indicates the plaintiff to be barred, even under pre-
1969 intersection law, in both the first and third alternatives above
described and impliedly in the second. Hodgson expressly covers
the second alternative when it states that for statutory right-of-way
90. The statutory right-of-way rule, if it is to be effective, must be accom-
panied by an observance by both parties of the rules applicable to the
exercise of due care and in particular the duty to keep a lookout and
make effective observations at a time when such observations can have
an effect consonant with underlying purpose of the rules. 187 Neb. at
741, 193 N.W.2d at 782.
91. 144 Neb. 790, 14 N.W.2d 596 (1944).
92. 187 Neb. at 742, 193 N.W.2d at 783.
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rules to be effective, a motorist must keep a lookout "and make ef-
fective observations."93 Moreover, Hodgson quotes with approval
from Barajas where plaintiff was held barred as a matter of law
because it "was her duty to look for approaching automobiles and
to see those within the radius that denoted the limit of danger."' ' 4
This brings to mind also the rule that failing to stop for an object
within range of vision is negligence as a matter of law. As for the
third alternative above, where the plaintiff is the motorist on the
right and looks and sees the approaching motorist from the left on
a collision course but does not take sufficient action to avoid the
collision, there are numerous Nebraska cases holding such a motor-
ist barred as a matter of law.
Thus, in Stocker v. Roach,95 plaintiff's car was stopped on the
edge of a highway at night when its lights failed and the plaintiff
and his wife walked behind the car to signal other drivers. Defend-
ant, coming from the rear, struck both of them and then their car.
Plaintiff sued and defendant cross-petitioned. The court held the
defendant was barred from recovery as a matter of law on his cross-
petition because he did not slow after seeing plaintiff's wife. 96
In Doiald v. Heller,97 the plaintiff motorcyclist was driving
along a highway in daytime. The defendant's car, coming from a
side road, stopped and then started slowly across the highway.
Plaintiff saw the defendant's car when it was 300 to 400 feet away,
but continued at 40 or 50 miles per hour and did not slow until
90 feet away when it was too late to avoid a collision with the de-
fendant. The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding
that plaintiff's failure to slow sooner barred his recovery. The
court stated that he had made no "attempt to decrease his speed,
except to retard the throttle and shut off the gas."",,
In Allen v. Cavanaugh,"9 the plaintiff drove along a country
road at night, and saw the defendant's car stopped 300 feet ahead
near the middle of the road. Yet plaintiff continued at a speed of
93. Id. at 742, 193 N.W.2d at 783.
94. Id. at 741, 193 N.W.2d at 782 (emphasis added).
95. 140 Neb. 561, 300 N.W. 627 (1941).
96. If this court should decline to hold the defendant's conduct
to be negligent, the court would be in the anomalous position
of holding that failure to see an object within range of a
driver's lights, or failure to so drive or control a car that the
driver can avoid a collision with obstacles appearing within
range of his lights, constitutes negligence, but that failure to
exercise any care after being aware of an obstacle, if not a
warning, is not negligence.
Id. at 566, 300 N.W. at 629.
97. 143 Neb. 600, 10 N.W.2d 447 (1943).
98. 143 Neb. at 609, 10 N.W.2d at 451.
99. 160 Neb. 645, 71 N.W.2d 119 (1955).
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15 miles per hour trying to pass the defendant's car on the left.
There was not enough room to do so, and the plaintiff struck the
car. The court held that though the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence, plaintiff was barred from recovery because of his own con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The opinion noted that
plaintiff saw defendant's car when it was 300 feet away and as he
drew closer, but continued toward the danger.
In Klement v. Lindell,"'1 plaintiff approached a highway and
stopped at a stop sign. As he started to cross the highway, he saw
defendant's truck approaching. Plaintiff continued and the defend-
ant's truck struck plaintiff's car on the side. The Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant, noting that
plaintiff "continued a negligent course of conduct by driving di-
rectly in front of the truck, thereby exposing himself to danger that
was imminent. His failure to use proper precaution, under the
circumstances, makes him guilty of contributory negligence more
than slight."'"'
In Dryer v. Malm, 1 0 2 the plaintiff drove along a gravel country
road in daytime and came over a hill at 55-60 miles per hour. He
saw about 1800 sheep owned by the defendant blocking the road.
Although the sheep were about 400 feet away, plaintiff did not try
to stop until she had gone 287 feet and then ran off the road. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the action of the trial court in
dismissing her suit was correct, because she was barred by her own
contributory negligence in not stopping sooner after seeing the dan-
ger. The court stated that it "became her duty in the light of what
she admittedly knew and saw, in the exercise of ordinary care, to
so operate her automobile as to bring it under control and avoid
such an eventuality as befell her."' '1
Hodgson involved an intersection where the views of both mo-
torists were obstructed until the motorists were practically in the
100. 139 Neb. 540, 298 N.W. 137 (1941).
101. Id. at 545, 298 N.W. at 139.
102. 163 Neb. 72, 77 N.W.2d 804 (1956).
103. Id. at 79, 77 N.W.2d at 803. Accord, Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94,
158 N.W.2d 275 (1968) (defendant's foot brake did not hold, but de-
fendant did not use emergency brake); Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404,
100 N.W.2d 65 (1959) (plaintiff on an arterial highway saw defendant
coming from the side street, but did not put on his brakes until he was
40 or 50 feet from defendant); Ecker v. Union Pac. R.R., 164 Neb. 744,
83 N.W.2d 551 (1957) (decedent saw the defendant's train coming but
did not go to a safe area); Berlo v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 104 Neb.
827, 178 N.W. 912 (1920) (plaintiff motorist saw the defendant's street
car backing into the street a block away but did nothing to avoid colli-
sion until the last moment); Russell v. Elec. Garage Co., 90 Neb. 719,
134 N.W. 253 (1912) (motorist put on brakes but made no effort to
turn).
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intersection. In Weber, the two motorists had a clear view of each
other for the last 250 feet. In Barajas, the opinion indicated that
there was a hedge along the intersection which made vision diffi-
cult. In Evans, there was a city residential intersection where the
view of plaintiff was partly blocked to his left though the opinion
said that when plaintiff was 40 feet from the intersection he could
see the lights of defendant. There, plaintiff was held negligent as
a matter of law. Evans is the case primarily relied on by Barajas,
which in turn is relied on by Hodgson.
In Parsons v. Cooperman,04 also cited in Barajas, plaintiff testi-
fied that he first saw the defendant's car about one and one-half
car lengths before plaintiff's car struck the right side of defendant's
vehicle. The court noted that if this testimony were undisputed,
plaintiff would be guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to de-
feat recovery. In Wendel v. Carlson,10 5 also cited by Barajas, there
was an open-view country road intersection collision where plaintiff
did not look and was struck on the left side. The court held plain-
tiff guilty of negligence as a matter of law, noting that he could
have seen cars approaching the intersection from left or right for
about a quarter of a mile. In Miller v. Aitken,10 again cited by
Barajas, there was a blind country road intersection.
Whether the intersection is blind, wide-view, or some in-between
variation, under the Hodgson rule, particularly if one adds it to the
effect of the 1969 legislative changes, both drivers usually are negli-
gent as a matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
As indicated at the start of this article, the first rules as to rights
at intersections were that neither motorist had a right-of-way, or
that the first-entering motorist had the right-of-way. It was not
until well into the 1900s that a rule was applied giving motorists
on the right a preference. The reason for the latter rule was a de-
sire to make rights and obligations at intersections clearer.
It is uncertain when and on what basis the rule originated giving
a preference to the motorist on the right. Neither cases, encyclo-
pedias, texts, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the National
Safety Council, the Library of Congress, nor the Uniform Vehicle
Code has the answer.
In the British Isles, motorists drive on the left. Apparently this
same custom was used at one time in some of the provinces of
104. 161 Neb. 292, 73 N.W.2d 235 (1955).
105. 162 Neb. 742, 77 N.W.2d 212 (1956).
106. 160 Neb. 97, 69 N.W.2d 290 (1955).
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Canada. 107 In those countries where motorists drive on the left side
of the highway, a rule giving preference to the motorists on the
right has far more reason. Thus, a driver in Britain on approaching
an unprotected intersection should as a matter of safety look first
to the right rather than the left, because it is from the right that
a motorist will first cross his path. Any defensive driving manuals
in Britain should advise a motorist on approaching an unprotected
intersection to look first to the right, regardless of the right-of-way
which the law might apply. In the United States, where motorists
drive on the right and the first motorist from a point of danger
would be from the left, a driver should as directed in the defensive
driving manuals, look first to the left.
It might be that the rule which finally emerged to give a pref-
erence to the motorist on the right came from the much older rule
as to ships at sea. When steam vessels are in a "crossing" situation,
analogous to motor vehicles entering an intersection, the vessel
"which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of
the way of the other."'u0 The rule requiring a steam vessel to give
preference in a crossing situation to another steam vessel on the
right goes back at least to an 1869 United States Supreme Court
case' 0 9 involving an 1860 collision. The opinion stated that the
"regulations then existing required that when two steam vessels
were crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, the one which had
the other on her own starboard should keep clear."' I This naviga-
tional rule hardly applies to high speed motor vehicles in land road
intersections. With ships at sea, there may be many minutes during
which ships on a collision course can observe each other and take
corrective action including the giving of whistle blasts. One of the
statutes"' dealing with ship navigation rules in fact states that
when steam vessels are in a crossing situation, and there is a risk
of collision, either vessel shall give as a signal of intention to comply
with the rule one whistle blast, and the other vessel shall answer
with a similar blast. Such rules for ships at sea hardly are prac-
tical for motorists.
Any rule giving preference to the motorist on the right is confus-
ing, contrary to safe driving and impractical at today's high speeds.
It would appear after the 1969 amendments and recent case deci-
sions that there is little left of any rule which might still exist giv-
ing a preference to the motorist on the right, and that in the usual
107. 29 C.J. Highways § 415 (1922).
108. 33 U.S.C. §§ 204, 283 (1970). See 33 U.S.C. § 344(a) (1970).
109. The Columbia, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 246 (1869).
110. Id. at 250.
111. 33 U.S.C. § 344 (1970).
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situation of an intersection accident, both drivers are negligent as
a matter of law.
If there are any intersection accident cases which are still for
the jury to decide, there should in any event not be an instruction
that the motorist on the right "has" any right of way as this provi-
sion has been removed from the statutes since 1969.
It appears that no right-of-way rule or combination of rules en-
acted in the last 50 years has worked. For safety and clarity, it
seems that we should return to what appears to be the very earliest
rule, that no motorist has right-of-way at an intersection, and that
both motorists must use due care.
This is the direction in which we are being led by both the Ne-
braska Supreme Court and the Nebraska Legislature, a direction
which should cause more caution by motorists approaching open in-
tersections-and thus promote the saving of life and property.
